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Abstract 
 
Theoretical models concerning Credit Unions (CUs) suggest that the type of CU domination determines the way 
it  allocates  the  monetary  value  it  generates.  A  borrower-  (saver-)  dominated  CU  benefits  borrower  (saver) 
members at the expenses of saver (borrower) members, and a neutral CU equally benefits its member groups. 
This paper applies direct measure of monetary benefits to each member group (Patin & McNiel, 1991a) to test 
for the existence of dominated behavior in Brazilian CUs, and is the first to apply panel data regressions to 
identify the determinants of CUs behavior. We use a unique panel data with 40,664 observations taken from 533 
CUs affiliated with the largest Brazilian cooperative network. Results indicate Brazilian CUs are dominated by 
borrowers, but behave close to neutrality. Panel regression estimates show that common or multiple bond type, 
size and overdue loans of a CU have no effect on its behavior, the greater the total amount of loans over social 
capital and adjusted equity over total assets are the more likely a CU is borrower dominated, and the greater the 
age and current operational expenses over total asset of a CU are the more likely a CU is saver dominated.  
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Introduction 
 
 
The owners (members) of a financial cooperative, or simply credit union (hereafter CU), are 
borrowers who consume loans and savers who supply savings deposits. The gap between the dividend 
rate paid to savers and the interest/loan rate paid by borrowers gives the main source of income to a 
CU (Spencer, 1996).  
A CU acts as a financial intermediary between its net saver members, who want high dividend 
rates on savings (i.e., shares in CUs), and its net borrower members, who prefer low interest rates on 
loans. These two opposite objectives of member groups create the inherent borrower-saver conflict in 
CUs  (Smith,  1986).  Thus, a  borrower-  (saver-)  oriented/dominated  CU  is  expected  to  benefit  net 
borrower (saver)  members at the  expenses  of  net saver (borrower)  members, and a neutral CU is 
expected to equally benefit its member groups. This paper aims to investigate and explain the member 
group orientation/domination of CUs in Brazil. 
We have divided the literature on CUs member group orientation/domination into theoretical 
and empirical groups of studies. As follows, we first review the most important theoretical studies, and 
then the most important empirical studies on CUs member group orientation/domination. 
Taylor  (1971)  was  one  of  the  first  authors  to  explicitly  recognize  the  existence  of  conflict 
among member groups within a CU. On the basis of a simple graphical analytical model of CU, he 
shows the conflict among member groups is not likely to restrict membership, and therefore credit 
availability, on purely economic grounds. The first reason for this is that members do not belong 
exclusively to one group (i.e., borrowers or savers) or other. The second reason is that the relationships 
between current savers and new borrowers, and current borrowers and new savers, are complementary.  
Disagreeing with Taylor (1971), Flannery (1974) used a simple graphical analytical model to 
show that non price rationing (i.e., restrictions  on  membership) is  crucial  for saver and borrower 
dominated CUs to operate. Exactly because of this, Flannery (1974) argued that dominated CUs would 
produce more distortion in terms of credit availability than simple profit maximizing monopolistic 
competitors. A neutral credit union, which is considered by Flannery to act exactly like a simple sales 
maximizing  firm,  would  supply  more  credit  to  consumers  than  capital  markets  operating  under 
monopolistic competition.  
Following this line of inquiry, Smith, Cargill and Meyer (1981) develop a theoretical model in 
which a CU chooses the loan rate and dividend rate so as to maximize the weighted sum of the net 
gains on savings and loans, with the weights labeled behavioral preference parameters. They show that 
the loan rate for a borrower- (saver-) oriented CU would be less (more) than for a neutral CU, and the 
dividend rate on savings would be less (more) than for a neutral CU; and that a borrower- (saver-) 
oriented CU would issue more (less) debt or invest extra funds less (more) than if equal treatment or 
neutral  behavior  was  the  case.  Despite  their  results,  they  argue  that  a  CU  would  likely  seek  to 
maximize  its  total  net  gain  or,  in  other  words,  behave  neutrally  for  three  reasons.  First,  neutral 
behavior  is  coherent  to  the  fairness  and  equity  considerations  that  lie  behind  the  cooperative 
philosophy.  Second,  borrowers  or  savers  might  hesitate  to  participate  in  a  CU  that  intentionally 
penalizes their interests. Third, individual members might always switch in their roles as net borrowers 
or net savers.  
The model developed by Smith et al. (1981) was extended by Smith (1984) in order to consider 
that savings and loan transactions have maturities which extend beyond current period. Thus, Smith 
(1984) incorporated into his model a more realistic and detailed balance sheet constraint, and imposes 
that the operating statement for the CU’s current accounting period must net out to zero. He showed 
that  the  optimal  loan  and  dividend  depend  critically  on  the  preferences  of  the  CU,  such  that  a 
borrower- (saver-) oriented CU will treat savers (borrowers) so as to maximize profit and use the profit 
to set the lowest (highest) possible loan rate (dividend rate). He also showed that in a borrower- 
(saver-) oriented CU the loan (dividend) rate would tend to absorb exogenous disturbances while the Brazilian Credit Union Member Groups    43 
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dividend (loan) rate would tend to remain unchanged. Interestingly, Smith (1988) extended Smith’s 
(1984)  stylized  model  of  CU  to  incorporate  uncertainty,  but  only  considered  risk  neutral  CUs  to 
develop his entire model, thus ignoring the CU orientation/domination issue.  
Other  works  such  as  Black  and  Dugger  (1981)  and  Walker  and  Chandler  (1977)  have  not 
developed formal analytical models of CUs, but still recognize that a CU orientation is likely to affect 
the manner it operates or behaves. Thus, it should be noticed that, except for Spencer (1996), all 
theoretical studies after Taylor (1971) have recognized the conflict among member groups translated 
into the CU domination/orientation is likely to affect the way CUs are operated and behave.  
In  terms  of  empirical  evidences  on  the  significance  of  dominated  behavior  among  CUs, 
Flannery (1974) seems to have been the first study attempting to classify CUs as saver-dominated, 
borrower-dominated  or  neutral.  However,  it  failed  to  distinguish  between  variations  caused  by 
dominated behavior and random errors so that its results should be taken with caution (Smith, 1986).  
Smith (1986) tested the variant objective functions of CUs (i.e., saver- or borrower- oriented or 
neutral) by relying on comparative static results obtained by Smith (1984). In so doing, he employed a 
two-step approach where in the first step the CUs are classified into the borrower (saver) oriented 
group if their predicted values for loan (dividend) rates, obtained from two linear regression equations, 
are greater than (less than) the observed values for loan (dividend rates)
(1). In the second step, Smith 
(1986) tested the variant objective function of CUs by carrying out regressions to test if the classified 
CUs would respond to changes in the explanatory variables as predicted by the comparative static 
results obtained by Smith (1984). Because his results did not show any evidence to support the variant 
objective function hypothesis, he concluded that the 951 federally insured American credit unions in 
his sample had behaved neutrally from 1975 to 1979. 
Based on the theoretical works of Walker and Chandler (1977), Smith et al. (1981) and Smith 
(1984), Patin and McNiel (1991a) developed a direct measure of the net monetary benefits to saver 
and borrower members, and applied it to calculate the differences between the net monetary benefits 
allocated to savers (NMBS) and borrowers (NMBB) in the years 1984 and 1985 for each of 10,565 
(10,142) federally chartered and 4,657 (4,932) state chartered/federally insured CUs in the  United 
Sates.  They  tested  if  the  CU  industry  in  USA  balanced  the  interest  of  borrowers  and  savers  by 
observing if the mean of the differences between NMBS and NMBB for all CUs in their sample would 
differ from zero when using the t test. They found that the CU industry as a whole allocated more 
benefits to member-savers than to member-borrowers but argued that this result does not imply each 
CU  in  the  sample  exhibited  this  type  of  behavior.  Thus,  they  proposed  a  way  to  adjust  for  the 
possibility  of  size  bias  in  order  to  create  an  index  of  domination  for  each  CU.  Using  this  index 
distribution, they found that 80% of CUs they had previously classified showed evidence of neutral 
behavior. Patin and McNiel (1991b) employed this same approach to analyze CUs in USA and found, 
like Patin and McNiel (1991a), that most CUs exhibited neutral behavior. 
The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) of USA changed its membership policy in 
1982 so that members from groups without any affinity with the core group of a CU could participate. 
In other words, NCUA started to allow multiple group credit unions to operate. Since the National 
Association of Federal Credit Unions (NAFCU) claims that non-core members are more likely to be 
borrowers in a CU than the core members, Leggett and Stewart (1999) used a more restrictive version 
of the approach proposed by Patin and McNiel (1991a) to identify the orientation of 2,025 federally 
chartered CUs in 1997 from the twenty-five largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas in USA. They found 
that on average CUs were saver-oriented regardless of the type of their membership but common bond 
CUs had a stronger saver orientation than multiple bond CUs. 
Goddard and Wilson (2005) conducted an empirical study on the effect of size, age and growth 
of American CUs on their orientation and got results consistent with the work of Kohers and Mullis 
(1990). In  other  words, Goddard and  Wilson (2005) found that younger CUs are  likely borrower 
oriented while older CUS are likely saver oriented. According to them, the reason for this is that V. G. F. Bressan, M. J. Braga, M. de A. Resende Filho, A. A. Bressan  44 
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younger  CUs  would  set  lower  loan  rates  than  the  market  as  a  means  to  make  their  assets  and 
membership grow and, as a side effect, would attract borrowers. 
Although most theoretical studies have agreed that a CU orientation is likely to affect the way it 
behaves, there are few recent empirical studies on this issue for CUs located in developed countries, 
and almost  none for CUs in  developing  countries. In fact, except for the  work by Desrocher and 
Fischer (1999 as cited in Fischer, 2000), which detected both saver and borrower oriented CUs in 
Colombia, we could not find any other work on CU orientation/domination for developing countries.  
Of special interest to this paper, we could not find any previous work on the orientation of CUs 
in Brazil, which is of concern because it has been broadly recognized that CUs can improve financial 
access  for  the  poor  and,  therefore,  contribute  to  development  and  poverty  reduction  (Nair  & 
Kloeppinger-Todd, 2007). Furthermore, new regulatory rules introduced by the Central Bank of Brazil 
in its resolution 3.106 of 25th July 2003 allow for the creation of multiple bond or open-admission 
CUs,  which  increases  the  importance  of  investigating  the  behavior  of  CUs  in  Brazil;  where  it  is 
reasonable to suspect that “non-core members are more likely to be borrowers than core members” 
(Leggett & Stewart, 1999, pp. 235-236)
(2).  
The objectives of the present paper are twofold: to investigate and explain the member group 
orientation/domination of CUs in Brazil; and to investigate if Brazilian CUs have been more attractive 
to their members than other financial institutions, thus complying with CUs’ primary objectives: to 
promote thrift and provide credit at reasonable rates. This way, our work adds to the literature as the 
first to empirically study the orientation of Brazilian CUs, using a unique panel data obtained from the 
Brazilian  Credit  Cooperative  System  (hereafter  Sicoob-Brasil).  Note  that  the  Cooperative  Unions 
system in Brazil is composed of four CU networks: Sicredi, Unicredi, Ancosol, and Sicoob-Brasil, 
which is by far the largest one in Brazil
(3).  
This paper
(4) is organized so that in the following section presents the basis to measure benefits 
and how they are divided across the members of a CU. Next follows the literature review on models of 
domination  in  credit  unions  and  their  estimation,  and  the  specification  of  the  baseline  panel  data 
regression model. Then the empirical results on Brazilian CU  member domination and the factors 
determining  it  are  presented.  Finally,  the  paper  closes  with  a  summary,  main  conclusions  and 
directions for future research. 
 
 
Measuring Benefits for CU Members and How CUs Allocate Benefits among Member 
Groups 
 
 
Most  theoretical  articles  suggest  that  a  CU  orientation/domination  determines  the  way  it 
allocates  the  monetary  value  it  generates  among  its  saver  and  borrower  members.  Walker  and 
Chandler  (1977) pointed  out that the benefits a CU allocates to  its  members can be  divided  into 
monetary  and  non-monetary  benefits.  For  instance,  non-monetary  benefits  are  the  provision  of 
financial advice, and the convenience of directly deducting savings applications and loan payments out 
of a member’s payroll. However, Walker and Chandler (1977), Smith et al. (1981), Smith (1984), 
Patin  and  McNiel  (1991a),  and  Leggett  and  Stewart  (1999)  agree  that  non-monetary  benefits  are 
uniformly distributed across  members  of CUs and, therefore, will  have  no  effect  on the potential 
asymmetry by which benefits are distributed among their members group. Based on this, we ignore 
non-monetary benefits and focus only on how monetary benefits are distributed across CUs members.  
 
Monetary benefits allocated to savers 
 
As suggested by Patin and McNiel (1991a), we calculate the net monetary benefits received by 
saver members of the ith CU at time t using Equation (1). Brazilian Credit Union Member Groups    45 
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NMBSit = (WADRit – WAMDRit)*TSit  (1) 
where at time t, NMBSit is the net monetary benefits received by the ith CU saver-member, WADRit
(5) is 
the weighted average of the dividend rates paid by the ith CU on all savings instruments it offers, 
WAMDRit
(6) is the weighted average of the best alternative market dividend (savings) rates available on 
similar types  of savings  instruments outside the  ith  CU, and TSit is the total  monetary volume  of 
member savings balances in reais (R$) for the ith CU. 
Patin and McNiel (1991a) argue that Equation (1) measures the monetary benefits accruing to 
the ith CU saver members at time t net of the opportunity costs associated with their decisions, and is 
based on the theoretical works of Walker and Chandler (1977), Smith et al. (1981), and Smith (1984). 
 
Monetary benefits allocated to borrowers 
 
Patin  and  McNiel  (1991a)  suggest  that  the  net  monetary  benefits  received  by  the  ith  CU 
borrower members at time t should be calculated by Equation (2).  
NMBBit = (WAMLRit – WALRit*(1 – RRTit))*TLit  (2) 
where  at time  t,  NMBBit  is  the  net  monetary  benefits  received  by  the  CU  borrower  members, 
WAMLRit
(7) is the weighted average of market loan rates charged by other institutions on similar types 
of debts instruments to those offered by the ith CU, WALRit
(8)
 is the weighted average of loan rates 
charged by the ith CU for all types of loans to members, RRTit is the proportion of interest income on 
loans  refunded  to  CU  borrower  members,  and  TLit  is  the  total  monetary  volume  of  loans  to  the 
members of the ith CU. About RRTit, we use as proxy the total income refunded to a CU’s members in 
R$ over the total R$ income obtained by a CU from all charges on loans calculated as presented in the 
Appendix.  
Note  that  Equation  (2)  measures  the  monetary  benefits  accruing  to  the  ith  CU  borrower 
members  net  of  the  opportunity  costs  associated  with  borrowers’  decisions,  and  is  based  on  the 
theoretical works of Walker and Chandler (1977), Smith et al. (1981), and Smith (1984). 
In order to empirically compare the treatment of borrowers and savers, we follow Patin and 
McNiel (1991a), and calculate by Equation (3) the difference (difit) between the net benefits allocated 
by the ith CU at time t to each member group. 
difit = NMBSit – NMBBit  (3) 
The ith CU allocates more monetary benefits to savers (borrowers) at time t if difit is greater 
(lower)  than  zero,  otherwise  the  ith  CU  equally  allocates  benefits  to  both  member  groups. 
Furthermore, 
1
n
i it dif   can  be  used  to  investigate  how  a  CU  industry  allocates  aggregate  benefits 
across member groups at time t such that if 
1 0
n
i it dif      1 ( 0)
n
i it dif    then the CU industry allocates a 
greater level of aggregate net monetary benefits to member-savers (member-borrowers); otherwise, the 
CU industry equally allocates net monetary benefits among member groups (Patin & McNiel, 1991a). 
Patin and McNiel (1991a) suggested adjusting for size bias by calculating the degree to which 
the  ith  CU  allocates  benefits  among  member  groups  at  time  t  as  the  index  of  domination  (IDit) 
calculated by Equation (4). 
it
it
t
ds
ID
std
  
(4) 
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it it
it
it it
NMBS NMBB
ds
TS TL
 
(5) 
2
1
1
n
i it
t
ds
std
n
 


 
(6) 
for the ith CU, dsit gives the  difference between NMBSit per real  of savings and NMBBit per real 
loaned, and stdt is the standard deviation of dsit about zero at time t. Thus, the absolute value of IDit 
gives the extent by which the ith CU deviates from perfect neutral behavior (IDit=0) at time t, and its 
signal shows if the ith CU is saver dominated (IDit>0) or borrower dominated (IDit<0).  
 
Data 
 
The  data  used  in  this  paper  is  an  unbalanced  panel  with  40,664  observations  of  monthly 
accounting information for 533 Brazilian CUs affiliated with Sicoob-Brasil from January 2000 to June 
2008, which represents 58.51% of the CUs affiliated with Sicoob-Brasil during this time period. Note 
that Sicoob-Brasil comprises 46.32% of all Brazilian single CUs, which makes Sicoob-Brasil by far 
the largest cooperative network in Brazil (Soares & Melo, 2007). The sources of our data are the 
Central Bank of Brazil, Sicoob-Brasil and Sicoob’s Deposit insurance Administration.  
 
 
Models of Domination in Credit Unions and their Estimation 
 
 
We rely on the literature as summarized in Table 1 as the basis to specify the variables and the 
functional forms of our models. 
 
Table 1 
 
Common Variables Used to Explain the Domination in CUs 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
For Saver-
Dominated CUs 
For Borrower-
Dominated CUs 
For Neutral CUs  Authors 
Fees on loans and 
dividend rates 
High fees on loans 
and high dividend 
rates on savings 
 
Low fees on loans 
and low dividend 
rates on savings 
 
Intermediate fees on 
loans and interest 
rates on savings 
Taylor (1971), 
Flannery (1974), 
Smith et al. (1981), 
Smith (1984, 1986), 
Patin and McNiel 
(1991a), Leggett and 
Stewart (1999) 
Size as a CU’s total 
asset 
Intermediate  Low  High  Patin and McNiel 
(1991a), Smith 
(1986)
8 
Average monetary 
volume of loans and 
savings per member 
Intermediate  Low  High  Patin and McNiel 
(1991a) 
Net income 
distribution 
Most of the net 
income is distributed 
as dividends 
Most of the net 
income is distributed 
as low loan rates 
Equally distributed  Patin and McNiel 
(1991a) 
Continues 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
For Saver-
Dominated CUs 
For Borrower-
Dominated CUs 
For Neutral CUs  Authors 
Loans over social 
capital 
*  *  *  Patin and McNiel 
(1991a) 
Age as time of 
existence  
High  Low  *  Kohers and Mullis 
(1990), Smith (1986) 
Common or multiple 
bond type of CU 
Most likely a 
common bond type 
Most likely a 
multiple bond type 
*  Leggett and Stewart 
(1999) 
Adjusted equity over 
total assets, as a 
measure of a CU 
stability  
*  *  *  Leggett and Stewart 
(1999) 
Operational expenses 
over total asset, as a 
measure of a CU 
efficiency 
*  *  *  Leggett and Stewart 
(1999) 
Overdue loans over 
total amount of 
loans, as a measure 
of quality of assets 
*  *  *  Leggett and Stewart 
(1999) 
Geographical 
location 
*  *  *  Smith (1986) 
Reserve of capital, as 
the total of reserves 
plus indivisible 
surpluses divided by 
total asset 
Positive signal  Negative signal  *  Smith (1986) 
Average cost of 
operations 
Negative signal  Positive signal  *  Smith (1986) 
Total reserves over 
gross total revenue 
Negative signal  Positive signal  *  Smith (1986) 
Note. * denotes that although the authors thought of the variable as important and included it in their analysis, they could not 
find a clear pattern for the effect of the variable on the behavior of CUs. 
From Table 1, we observe the variables fees on loans and dividend rates, average monetary 
volume of loans and savings per member, net income distribution, and average cost of operations 
are all by their own definitions closely related to IDit. Based on this and the lack of data available on 
those variables, we chose not to include those variables in our models 
We also did not include in our models the variable reserves over gross total revenue because 
of its high correlation with accounting records used to compute the variable reserve of capital. Also, 
we didn’t use the variable reserve of capital in our models because it is highly correlated with the 
variable adjusted equity over total assets. Finally, we did not include a CU geographical location in 
our models because it is a CU characteristic that does not change over time and, therefore, is already 
captured by the fixed effects models. 
The remaining variables in Table 1, size as CU’s total asset, loans over social capital, age
(9), 
common or multiple bond type of CU, adjusted equity over total assets, operational expenses 
over total asset and overdue loans over total amount of loans were all included in our models.  
 
   V. G. F. Bressan, M. J. Braga, M. de A. Resende Filho, A. A. Bressan  48 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 10, n. 1, art. 3, pp. 40-56, Jan./Mar. 2013                      www.anpad.org.br/bar   
Baseline panel data regression model 
 
The general procedure we use to search for the best model is composed of five steps. First, we 
estimate the pooled and fixed effects models and test if pooled is preferred to the fixed effects model 
by the Chow test. Second, we estimate the random effects model and test if pooled is preferred to 
random  effects  model  by  the  Breusch-Pagan  test.  Third,  we  test  if  the  random  effects  model  is 
preferred to fixed effects model by the Hausman test. Provided that fixed effects is preferred to pooled 
and  random  effects  models,  we  test  for  first-order  autocorrelation  by  the  F-test  as  proposed  by 
Wooldridge (2002), and for within group homoscedasticity by the Wald test. Finally, provided that 
absence  of  first-order  autocorrelation  and  group  homoscedasticity  are  rejected,  we  re-estimate  the 
fixed effects model by Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimators as proposed by Judge, 
Griffiths, Hill, and Lütkepohl (1985), and Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). Note that Baltagi and Wu 
(1999)  and  Hansen  (2007)  also  use  FGLS  estimators  for  fixed  effects  linear  panel  data  models 
presenting autocorrelation.  
The causal relationship of interest is captured by the benchmark regression model formalized as 
Equation (7). 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 it it it it it it it it i it ID size lsc age dt aeta oeta ol v                      (7) 
where i = 1,..., 533 indexes CUs, t = 1, ..., 102 indexes the observation’s month such that: t = 1 denotes 
January of 2000 and t = 102 denotes June of 2008; IDit is the index of domination as in Equation (4); 
0 is the intercept; the ’s are coefficients; sizeit stands for the size of the ith CU measured as its total 
asset in R$ at time t; lscit denotes the total amount of loans over social capital; ageit denotes the time of 
existence of the ith CU in years at time t; dtit is a dummy variable with value zero for common bond 
type of CUs and value one for multiple bond type of CUs; aetait denotes the adjusted equity over total 
assets; oetait denotes the current operational expenses over total asset; olit denotes overdue loans over 
total amount of loans;  i v is the ith CU fixed effects which are non-observables and do not vary over 
time; and it  is  an  i.i.d.  stochastic error. For  the random  effects  model, vi should be taken as i.i.d. 
random variables distributed with zero mean and constant variance.  
 
 
Empirical Evidence and Discussion 
 
 
In this section we first discuss the empirical evidence of dominated behavior in Brazilian Credit 
Unions by analyzing the results obtained for the variables NMBSit (net monetary benefits received by 
saver members), NMBBit (net monetary benefits received by borrower members), difit (the difference 
between NMBSit and NMBBit), and IDit ( the index of domination for Brazilian credit unions). In the 
second part of this section we present the estimates of the panel regression models and, relying on 
them, discuss the determinants of the index of domination in Brazilian Credit Unions. 
The values for NMBSit were calculated according to Equation (1) such that a positive (negative) 
value  for NMBSit  means the ith CU  offers  more favorable (less favorable)  dividend rates to their 
members than the best outside alternatives in the financial market. We find 92% of the calculated 
values of NMBSit were positive, which shows most Brazilian CUs offered more favorable dividend 
rates to their members than the outside financial market from January 2000 to June 2008.  
We calculate the values for NMBBit according to Equation (2) such that a positive (negative) 
value for NMBBit means the ith CU offers more favorable (less favorable) loan rates to their saver 
members than the best outside alternatives in the financial market. Note that by Equation (2), NMBBit 
is calculated adjusting the loan rates charged by the ith CU so to consider the proportion of interest 
income on loans refunded to CU borrower members. We found 77.8% of the calculated NMBBit were Brazilian Credit Union Member Groups    49 
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positive, which shows most Brazilian CUs offered more favorable loan rates to their members than the 
outside financial market from January 2000 to June 2008. In other words, the Brazilian CUs were 
more attractive as source of money for potential borrowers than other financial institutions.  
Although observed values of NMBSit and NMBBit indicate Brazilian CUs are more attractive for 
borrowing and depositing money than the outside financial market, it is the difference between NMBSit 
and NMBBit, difit calculated by Equation (3) which gives the ith CU orientation/domination at time t. 
We  found  73.6%  of  the  calculated  values  of  difit  were  negative,  which  gives  evidence  that  most 
Brazilian CUs allocated more monetary benefits to their borrower members than to saver members 
from January 2000 to June 2008. To shed  more  light  on this result, as a first step we tested the 
hypothesis by which the variable difit follows a normal distribution by the Jarque and Bera (1980) and 
Doornik and Hansen (1994) tests. The rejection of the null hypothesis by these tests indicates there is 
no statistical basis for testing the difference between the mean of difit for the group with difit>0 (i.e., 
CUs are more favorable to saver members) and the mean of difit for the group with difit<0 (i.e., CUs 
are more favorable to borrower members) by a paired Student’s t-test as in Patin and McNiel (1991a).   
As an alternative to the paired Student’s t-test, we used the non-parametric Wilcoxon’s (1945) 
signed-rank test, and in addition tested if the medians of difit for the group with difit>0 and for group 
with difit<0 come from the same probability distribution by the Mann-Whitney test. Results for these 
two tests indicated the medians of difit for the group with difi > 0 and for the group with difi<0 are 
statistically and significantly different, and did not come from the same probability distribution. In 
other words, the group of CUs more favorable to saver members is statistically different from the 
group  of CUs  more favorable to borrower  members. Based  on this and in the fact that  73.6% of 
calculated values of difit are negative in the panel, we conclude that most individual Brazilian CUs 
generated more benefits for the group of borrower members at the expense of the group of saver 
members from January 2000 to June 2008. 
Patin  and  McNiel  (1991a)  criticized  the  simple  use  of  difit  as  an  indicator  of  CUs 
orientation/domination, and suggested fixing the size bias created with the use of difit by calculating 
the index of domination IDit as given by Equation (4). Thus, the sign of IDit indicates if ith CU at time 
t was dominated by borrower members (IDit < 0) or by saver members (IDit > 0), and the magnitude of 
the absolute value of IDit gives a relative measure of the deviation from the neutral behavior such that 
the closer to zero IDit is, the closer to neutrality a CU behaves. The calculated vales of IDit ranged 
from -21.7481 to 22.4244 with a mean of 0.0326 and standard deviation of 0.6467. We found 87.3% 
of IDit values were negative, which confirms the individual Brazilian CUs are borrower dominated, as 
they generated more benefits for the group of borrower members at the expense of the group of saver 
members. We  also  observed  that  most  IDit  values  are  close  to  zero.  Therefore,  we  conclude  that 
individual Brazilian CUs are borrower dominated, but behave close to neutrality. 
 
Determinants of the index of domination in Brazilian Credit Unions  
 
Having  found  that  individual  Brazilian  credit  unions  are  mostly  dominated  by  borrower- 
members, we proceed to investigate the determinants of such domination behavior using the estimates 
obtained for the panel data regression models. First we present in Table 2 summary statistics for the 
variables we used in the estimation of the models. 
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Table 2 
 
Sample Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
 
Variables  Mean  Standard Deviations  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent variable 
ID  -0.0323  0.6470  -21.7480  22.4240 
Explanatory variables 
size  1.25e+07  4.17e+07  134.9700  1.31e+09 
lsc  4.4970  11.5190  0.0000  646.1670 
age  10.3011  7.8979  0.4050  41.4600 
dt  0.9670  0.1790  0.0000  1.0000 
aeta  0.2520  1.9420  -268.235  2.7700 
oeta  0.0330  0.0460  0.000  3.7940 
ol  0.0930  3.3170  1.68e-06  583.5680 
The estimates for the panel data regression models are reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 
 
Estimates of the Determinants of the Index of Domination for Brazilian Credit Unions, from 
January 2000 to June 2008 
 
Explanatory Variable  Pooled  Fixed Effects  Random Effects  Fixed Effects by FGLS 
size  -0.0000*  -0.0000*  -0.0000*  -0.0000 
lsc  -0.0037*  -0.0016*  -0.0012*  -0.0012* 
age  0.0042*  0.0092*  0.0068*  0.0030* 
dt  0.0905*  0.0484*  0.0435*  0.0030 
aeta  -0.8650*  -1.5225*  -1.4412*  -0.2878* 
oeta  2.7773*  0.5697*  0.7773*  0.2342* 
ol  0.0005  0.0002  0.0002  0.0000 
constant  0.0660*  0.2871*  0.3180*  2.0235* 
N. of observations  40 664  40 664  40 664  40 664 
N. of groups  0  533  533  533 
Chow test: F(532, 40 124) = 21.09, p-value = 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan test: 2 (1) = 32,431.63, p-value = 0.0000 
Hausman test: 2 (6) = 528.10, p-value = 0.0000 
Wooldridge test: F(1,532) = 18.507, p-value = 0.0000 
Wald test: 
2(112) = 8.7E+07, p-value = 0.0000 
Note: An *denotes a coefficient statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
Test results presented in the bottom of Table 3 show fixed effects model is preferred to pooled 
model by Chow test, and random effects model is preferred to pooled model by Breusch-Pagan test. In 
other words, random and fixed effects models are preferred to the pooled model, but fixed effects Brazilian Credit Union Member Groups    51 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 10, n. 1, art. 3, pp. 40-56, Jan./Mar. 2013                      www.anpad.org.br/bar   
model is preferred to random effects by Hausman test. Finally, because first-order autocorrelation and 
group  homoscedasticity are rejected respectively by  the Wooldridge and Wald tests, the preferred 
model is the fixed effects model estimated by Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) or simple 
Fixed Effects by FGLS as in the fourth column of table 2. Thus, the following discussion is all based 
on the results for Fixed Effects by FGLS 
Table 3 shows that for the fixed effects model estimated by FGLS, the coefficient of size is not 
statistically  significantly  different  from  zero,  which  means  the  CU’s  size  has  no  effect  on  the 
domination by members. Note that despite the coefficients of size are statistically significant for the 
other models, its coefficient estimates are all very close to zero.  
The coefficient of lscit (total amount of loans over social capital) is negative and statistically 
significantly different from zero, and indicates that for a one-unit increase in lscit the predicted value 
of the index of domination IDit should fall by 0.0012. Although the literature gives no conclusive 
direction for the effect of lscit on IDit, its negative signal seems reasonable. For instance, lscit can grow 
as a result of an increase of the total amount of loans produced by a reduction in the interest/loan rates, 
which  will  certainly  benefit  borrower  members.  Note  that  the  effect  of  lscit  on  IDit  is  not  big  in 
practical terms. For instance, for a 10 unit increase in lscit which is a huge increase, IDit falls only by 
0.012 which is very small compared to the sample range of variation of ID, -21.75 to 22.42 (see Table 2). 
Table 3 shows the coefficient of ageit is positive and statistically significant, which implies that 
is  more likely  for younger CUs to be dominated by borrower  members and for  older CUs to be 
dominated by saver  members, which  is in  line  with  Smith (1986), Kohers and Mullis (1990) and 
Goddard and Wilson (2005). Despite this, this result should be taken with caution. For instance, for a 
one year increase in ageit the index of domination IDit would increase only by 0.0030, which is very 
small compared with the sample range of variation of ID, -21.75 to 22.42 (see Table 2). Thus, the 
effect over time of increased ageit on IDit will likely be insufficient to move any CU in the sample 
from being dominated by borrowers to be dominated by savers and vice-versa. In other words, it is 
likely the 87.3% of negative values of IDit observed in our sample will remain close to this value in the 
following years if ageit is the only variable changing. 
The coefficient of the dummy variable dtit is not statistically significant, which implies that if a 
CU is of a multiple or common bond, type has no significant effect on its index of domination. Note 
that dtit is a dummy variable with value zero for common bond type of CUs and value one for multiple 
bond type of CUs and we would expect a negative signal for its coefficient. 
The  coefficient  of  aetait  (adjusted  equity  over  total  assets)  is  negative  as  expected,  and 
statistically significant (see Table 3), indicating that for a one-unit increase in aetait the expected value 
of the index of domination IDit should fall by 0.2878. Note that aetait can be taken as the reciprocal of 
the leverage index
(10) where the lower the leverage index is for a financial institution the less likely it 
will be capable of raising funds outside in the market. Thus, an increase in aetait, which is equivalent 
to a decrease in the leverage index, implies the CU can more easily raise funds from market, without 
relying on its saver members and, therefore, making it possible for the CU to reduce benefits for saver 
members.  
The coefficient of oetait (current operational expenses over total asset) is positive as expected 
and statistically significant (see Table 3), indicating that for a one-unit increase in oetait the expected 
value of the index of domination IDit should increase by 0.2342. Note that an increase in the current 
operational expenses relative to the total asset of a CU indicates that the CU is providing more benefits 
to its members. For instance, the CU is likely to be paying high dividend rates to saver members. 
Furthermore, oetait measures the costs of managing the CU’s assets and can be seen as the degree of 
operational efficiency of a CU. According to the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), to be 
considered operationally efficient a CU should have an oetait below 10% (Richardson, 2002). From 
Table 2, we observed that the mean value of oetait in the sample is 3.3%, indicating the CUs in the 
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Finally, the variable olit (overdue loans) is not statistically significant to explain the index of 
dominance in Brazilian credit unions. In addition, its estimated coefficient shows a value almost equal 
to zero. Despite this, we keep this variable in the model because of the overall statistic significant of 
the model by the Wald test. 
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
In  this  paper,  a  Credit  Union  (CU)  is  taken  as  a  financial  institution,  which  inherently 
intermediates conflict between saver members who want high dividend rate on savings and borrower 
members who prefer low interest rates on loans. Based on previous theoretical works, a borrower- 
(saver-)  oriented/dominated  CU  benefits  borrower  (saver)  members  at  the  expenses  of  saver 
(borrower) members, and a neutral CU equally benefits its member groups.  
In order to explain member group orientation/domination for Brazilian CUs, we used a unique 
panel data composed of 40,664 observations of monthly accounting information from January 2000 to 
June 2008 for 533 CUs affiliated to the Brazilian Credit Cooperative System (Sicoob-Brasil), which is 
by  far  the  largest  cooperative  network  in  Brazil.  We  found  that  individual  Brazilian  CUs  are 
dominated by borrower members, but behave closely to neutrality, as expected (Smith, Cargill, & 
Meyer, 1981). We also observed that individual Brazilian CUs are more attractive to their borrower 
and saver members than are other financial institutions, for instance, banks. In other words, Brazilian 
CUs seem to have complied with their primary objectives of promoting thrift and providing credit at 
reasonable rates. 
In order to investigate the determinants of member group orientation/domination for Brazilian 
CUs, we used Feasible Generalized Least Squares estimates obtained for a fixed effects panel data 
regression model. Based on its estimates, we found that common or multiple bond type, size and 
overdue loans of a CU have no individual effect on its orientation/domination. Hence, we expect new 
regulatory measures introduced by the Central Bank of Brazil as of July of 2003, which allow for the 
creation of multiple bond CUs, will have no effect on the domination behavior of Brazilian CUs.  
The preferred model estimates also showed that the total amount of loans over social capital 
and  adjusted  equity  over  total  assets  for  a  CU  are  individually  significant  to  explain  a  CU 
orientation/domination so that the greater each one of them is, the more likely a CU will be borrower 
dominated. On the other hand, results showed that the age and current operational expenses over 
total asset of a CU are individually significant so that the greater each of them, is the more likely a 
CU will be saver dominated. Finally, the average value of the current operational expenses over 
total asset in the panel data indicated that the Brazilian CUs were operationally efficient according to 
the criterion of the World Council of Credit Unions. 
We suggest that future research should focus on investigating the implications Brazilian CU 
domination has on the way the Brazilian CUs are administrated and on their financial sustainability. 
Also, as more data become available, the analysis conducted in the present paper should be extended 
so as to include CUs affiliated with the other Brazilian cooperative systems Sicredi, Unicredi, and 
Ancosol. 
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Notes  
 
 
1 Patin and McNiel (1991a) criticized this classification criterion, arguing that it fails to directly incorporate any measures of 
the benefits accruing to either borrowers or savers. 
2 Freitas, A. F. de, Amaral, I. C., & Braga, M. J. (2008). A influência dos riscos de liquidez e de crédito no processo de 
conversão das cooperativas de crédito rural em cooperativas de crédito de livre admissão: um estudo de caso [Versão 
eletrônica]. Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações, 2(4), 126-147, found that Brazilian common bond CUs who converted 
to open-admission experienced a significant increase in their levels of credit risk. Thus, it seems reasonable to conjecture that 
the increase in credit risk has been caused by the expansion of credit to new CUs members who, therefore, should have been 
necessarily borrowers.
 
3  Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Karacaovali, B., & Laeven, L. A. (2005). Deposit insurance around the world: a comprehensive 
database [World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3628].  The World Bank, Washington-DC, USA, presents a 
detailed description about financial cooperatives in Brazil. 
4 This paper was presented at the “2nd Brazilian Summit of Researchers on Cooperatives”. 
5 We used as proxy the total of the CU’s expenses with dividends payments divided by the total monetary volume of member 
savings balances, both measured as Real (R$) which is the Brazilian currency unit. 
6 We used as proxy the nominal interest rate for savings accounts at Brazilian banks measured as percentage per month. 
7 We use as proxy the average of the pre-fixed referential interest rates for free resources – personal credit – measured as 
percentage per month. 
8 We use as proxy the total income obtained by a CU from all charges on loans over the total volume of loans to CU 
members, both measured as R$. 
9 Smith (1986) does not find evidence of member groups’ domination but points out that the size effect can be captured by 
the variable age. 
10 Leverage is defined as the Total Assets over Adjusted Equity. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Operationalization of RRT 
 
RRT = proportion of interest income on loans refunded to CU borrower members: (E/C) 
E = refunded income in R$ 
Number of COSIF Account  Description 
(+) 6.1.7.00.00-2   Leftover or losses accumulated (balance at the end of month)  
(+) 4.9.3.10.00-5   Dividends and bonus to pay (balance at the end of month) 
C = income earned by the CU or fee charged by the CU on loans (movement of the month in R$) 
Number of COSIF Account  Description 
(+) 7.1.1.03.00-8  Income from advances to depositors (movement of the month) 
(+) 7.1.1.05.00-6  Income from loans (movement of the month) 
(+) 7.1.1.10.00-8  Income on discounted securities (movement of the month) 
(+) 7.1.1.15.00-3  Income from financing (movement of the month) 
(+) 7.1.1.40.00-9  Income of rural financing - free applications (movement of the month) 
(+) 7.1.1.50.00-6  Income of rural financing - passed and refunded applications (movement 
of the month) 
(+) 7.1.1.55.00-1  Income from agribusiness financing (movement of the month) 
Note. Source: Elaborated by authors. 
 